This article addresses the question of 'the left' in contemporary South Africa in two senses. It argues that the left within the Alliance, despite the launch of the New Growth Path, are failing to implement the sufficiently radical policy changes that are required to address the development challenges identified in the first half of the article. The left outside of the Alliance, meanwhile, despite recent attempts at co-ordination, lacks influence and remains disconnected from the masses.
Introduction
In the immediate post-apartheid period Connell (1995) published an essay that suggested there were good reasons to be either optimistic or pessimistic about the future for 'the left' in South Africa. His optimistic predictions were based on the influence of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) on the African National Congress (ANC)-led government, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as a policy programme of the left, and the strong commitment of South African citizens to democracy (Connell 1995: 19) . With hindsight the factors he outlined predicting a 'downward spiral' have proved to be more enduring than those suggesting a more positive outlook. In particular, Connell noted the shift to the right of the ANC, the limits to the influence of the SACP due to its membership of the Tripartite Alliance, and the disappearance of the popular movement that had been so significant in the fight against apartheid (1995: 19) .
It now seems apposite to revisit the question of 'the left' in post-apartheid South Africa for two main reasons. First, given the current socio-economic circumstances and the persistence of the historical legacies of the apartheid era (and before), there is, I argue, an 'objective' need for a revival, or renewal, of progressive forces within South Africa. I suggest in the first part of this article, that what is urgently needed is a shift away from the broadly neoliberal trajectory that the ANC government has pursued during the post-apartheid era; in particular since the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996. those who pursue social change informed by the broad notion of egalitarianism in the face of various inequalities within society. Here I would agree with the view of one of the interviewees for this research, who suggests, that a minimum standard for anyone to claim to be from 'the left' 'is a genuine commitment to social equality and a defence of democratic rights' (Wesso, 25 October 2011) . In terms of which actors in South Africa warrant analysis, here I have let the field of study be largely self-defined. This is because whether or not analysts agree as to the 'leftist' credentials of an individual or organisation, it is significant in itself if they proclaim such a position and self-identify as part of 'the left'. Within the South African context the most obvious example in this regard is the ANC, which President Zuma at a speech marking the centenary of the organisation was keen to reiterate is 'a disciplined force of the left with a bias towards the poor' (BBC 2012) . By focusing on those who selfidentify as 'the left' and mapping their intra-ideological debates, the boundaries of who is 3 relevant are largely drawn by the actors themselves. In terms of making an assessment of their leftist credentials I then make normative judgements based on the available evidence and in particular I seek to disentangle rhetoric from practice.
The central argument of the article is that an effective left formation in the country is not present. The reasons for this can be traced back to the dissolution of the popular structures of the anti-apartheid movement, especially the United Democratic Front (UDF), and their subsumption into the organisations of the Tripartite Alliance, and the ANC in particular. The second half of the article categorises the fractured nature of the numerous groupings within post-apartheid South Africa that self-identify as 'left'. It is suggested that the ANC and its Alliance partners are largely failing to introduce the radical policy changes necessary to address the desperate plight of the majority of South Africa's population. This is a consequence of the longstanding commitment of the Alliance to the 'two-stage' theory of the National Democratic Revolution, and the compromises that were made with capital during the negotiated transition to democracy. The article does identify some evidence of attempts to forge a renewal of cooperation between the many disparate leftist forces outside of the Alliance. However, at present the challenge remains of how to connect these to the masses, which are instead engaged in localised protest and struggle that lacks co-ordination, direction and leadership. Of the Alliance partners, it is argued that COSATU could potentially help in building that crucial link with the mass base. However, COSATU's membership of the Alliance has meant that its links with the wider community have been 'limited as it pays its allegiance first to the ANC' (Masiya 2014: 455) . Recent splits within COSATU and in particular the actions of the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) do suggest that things may be starting to change in this regard.
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The research for this article included nine semi-structured interviews with eleven individuals that represent a range of institutions that self-identify as 'left'. The interviews were conducted in Cape Town in October 2011. This constitutes one of the key contributions that this article makes to the existing literature. Often scholarship on 'the left' in South Africa is either focused on specific actors (Friedman 2012a) or tends to focus on Johannesburg and the surrounding region (Bond 2012) . Without conducting research on the ground there is a danger of over-emphasising the significance of certain organisations. For example, one of the key activists of the Democratic Left Front (DLF) acknowledges that it needs to 'invest in cadre-formation…we have done very well in a very short space of time, but it is still very early' (Andrews, 31 October 2011) . The limited and partial nature of these qualitative interviews is acknowledged and as a result they have been triangulated with speeches, primary documents and the secondary literature. The locational bias given the interviews were exclusively focused in Cape Town is also acknowledged and as one of my respondents noted, the situation might look slightly different, especially with regard to the extent of leftist activity outside of the Alliance, if one looked at Johannesburg (Trout, 28 October 2011) .
The rest of the article proceeds in the following fashion. The first half outlines what I see as the key realities of the political economy of South Africa, focusing in particular on rising levels of inequality and the persistence of poverty and underemployment. It is suggested that these realities pose major challenges to broad-based development in South Africa and I emphasise that the situation is a direct consequence of the macroeconomic strategy pursued since the end of apartheid. The second half of the article then assesses the significance and influence of self-identified leftist forces within South Africa and the extent to which they can be considered 'left' in relation to the definition outlined earlier. The left is understood as 5 being broadly composed of three layers: the left within the Tripartite Alliance, the left outside the Alliance, and the remnants of a revolutionary socialist left.
The Realities of Post-Apartheid South Africa
What is noticeable across these different elements within the left in South Africa is that they do appear to broadly agree on what the key development challenges are. This was evident from the research interviews conducted. Three main themes emerged from the interviews when respondents were asked what they saw as the main concerns in this regard: unemployment, rising inequality and poverty. At a rhetorical level, at least, these are also the major issues that are acknowledged by the government. In his July 2014 state of the nation address, after the national elections, President Zuma maintained that 'the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continue to affect the lives of many people' (2014).
However, despite this level of agreement on what the problems are, there is much less of a consensus on what the main obstacles are to overcoming these challenges. While members of the SACP, who hold key positions in the government, argue that a shift in the growth path engendered by changes in government policy will address these concerns, others in the left outside of the Alliance, see the continued hegemony of the ANC as the main concern (Wesso, 25 October 2011) . Then there are those in the revolutionary socialist left who question the entire 'notion that capitalism somehow or other can develop South Africa and that everybody can be a winner' (Blake, 27 October 2011) .
While there have been many achievements under ANC rule, the development challenges that the country faces demonstrate significant continuities from the apartheid era. South Africa 6 continues to reflect the polarised society that apartheid policy sought to embed. However, as Marais highlights 'attributing these outrages solely to the apartheid system hides the politicaleconomic contours of inequity that still define South African society ' (2011: 7) . Absolute poverty, measured by the familiar income-based indicators, has declined to a limited extent during the post-apartheid era, mainly as a result of the introduction of social grants by the government. Analysts have concluded that without the introduction of such basic state support the incidence of poverty would have worsened during the post-apartheid era (Liebbrandt et al. 2010: 46) . The trend of urbanisation has also had an impact on such absolute measures of poverty. Hence, '...what ordinary observers view as a manifestation of dreadful policy failure -peri-urban shack settlement stretching for miles with dreadful living conditions -is in reality an improvement over life in the depressed, hopeless rural periphery' (Desai, Maharaj, and Bond 2011: 3) . Nevertheless, a recent report highlights that 53.8% of the population are still below the national poverty line and over two-thirds of these people are living in extreme poverty (Statistics South Africa 2015a: 14) . It should also be noted that such absolute measures fail to capture the subjective and less quantifiable aspects of poverty.
As Marais (2011: 206) argues, poverty '...has important non-material dimensions (such as pride, self-respect, dignity, independence and physical security) that resist measurement and enumeration'. South Africa's official unemployment rate initially increased during the post-apartheid era from 16.9% in 1995 (the first full-year of the ANC-led government) to a peak of 31.2% in 2003 (International Labour Organization 2013 . Although the overall rate has since fallen somewhat, recent data for 2014 highlights how there is significant and persistent variation in the unemployment rate amongst racial groups as shown below. Source: Statistics South Africa (2015b: 4-5).
It should also be noted that the official unemployment rate only includes those members of Meanwhile, the distribution of income in post-apartheid South Africa remains stubbornly skewed in favour of the richest fractions of the population. This is reflected in the Gini Coefficient, which measures the extent of income inequality within a society. (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 32) Source: Leibbrandt et al. (2010: 78) .
Overall, the structure of the economy also demonstrates significant continuities from the apartheid era. This can be traced back to the negotiated nature of the transition to democracy.
It continues to be dominated by big monopoly capital (Anglo American, Anglovaal, Old
Mutual, Sanlam, Liberty Life, etc.) many of whom have now taken the opportunity provided by the liberalisation of capital controls to list on the London Stock Exchange. The economy remains wedded to a trajectory based on finance, mining and retail and what we have witnessed since 1994 is deindustrialisation. As Table 3 demonstrates the contribution of manufacturing to the overall GDP has declined significantly since 1995. In recent years this trend appears to have accelerated despite the introduction of an active industrial strategy discussed in the next section. Moreover, within the manufacturing sector itself, we have seen much slower growth in labour-intensive sectors than capital-intensive sectors. In part, as Gelb (2010: 52) suggests, this can be explained by trade liberalisation in the immediate post-apartheid era, which saw import penetration in labour-intensive sectors rise from 55.5% in 1993 to 67.5% in 1997. In addition to this, during the post-apartheid era, there has been a significant switch towards capital-intensive production processes within the South African economy as a whole (OECD 2010: 218) .
The Post-Apartheid Development Strategy
The situation described above, has developed during a period where the government has, since its adoption of the GEAR strategy in 1996, adopted a broadly neoliberal development strategy (Marais 2011: 139) . In fact, as Saul (2001: 20) makes clear, certain measures were agreed during the negotiated transition that precluded alternative policies being adopted by the ANC after the election in 1994. It is important to acknowledge that the particular content and form of neoliberalism in South Africa has taken on a local dimension. There has been, as noted in the previous section, a rise in the provision of social grants. However, although the number of recipients has risen dramatically, given that their real value is limited, it has been suggested by Bond that this is ultimately 'tokenistic welfarism' (Saul and Bond 2014: 176) Moreover, these grants (mainly focused on the elderly and child support) are means-tested and the current government has made it clear they are unsustainable and that South Africa cannot become a 'welfare state' (Business Report 2011b). In essence, they should be understood as a necessary part of the government's attempt to ensure social stability in the context of significant inequality. The government also introduced its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy designed to try and reverse the racially skewed distribution of income inherited from the apartheid regime. The main outcome of BEE, however, has been the growth of a black business elite described by one commentator as 'the new Randlords' (Russell 2010) . They are mostly ANC politicians (both active and retired) who, as a result of the benefits they enjoy from the current system, become ever more resistant to radical economic policy changes (Marais 2011: 144) .
The ANC had adopted the RDP as the equivalent of its manifesto for the 1994 election. Its philosophy was neo-Keynesian in that it sought to seek a balance between growth and development, on the one hand, and redistribution on the other. In the RDP document itself it is stated that, 'the key area where special measures to create jobs can link to building the economy and meeting basic needs is in redressing apartheid-created infrastructural disparities' (African National Congress 1994: 13). After the election this RDP Base Document was committed to a process of consultation amongst stakeholders. Unsurprisingly, not all sections of South African society were in favour of the development strategy outlined within it. This led to the RDP White Paper, which in particular incorporated criticisms over the costing of the programme, which came most notably from the business community. As a result it spoke of the need for fiscal discipline, private sector expansion and a greater external orientation in trade and industrial policies (Government of the Republic of South Africa 1994).
These ideas then came to prominence in the GEAR strategy that was published in June 1996
(Department of Finance 1996). This policy was formulated by a small number of government-appointed economists and was the result of exclusive discussions within the upper echelons of the ANC. GEAR was little removed from the type of neoliberal proposals found in numerous Washington Consensus-style loan agreements that had been implemented by the IMF and World Bank throughout much of the developing world. It was concerned with the state providing an enabling environment, with the ambitious targets for jobs and growth to be almost wholly dependent on the performance of the private sector. In particular GEAR was concerned with opening up South Africa to the global economy and there was a strong emphasis on foreign investment becoming the main driver of economic development. As a result, we have seen the liberalisation of capital controls which allowed major South African corporations to list overseas (in London and elsewhere). The premise being that they 'would be able to recapitalise and invest afresh in the South African economy (as 'foreign' investors)' (Marais 2011: 124) . In its external trade relations, due to its membership of the WTO, South Africa agreed to a range of tariff reductions. To demonstrate its commitment to the neoliberal model, in some parts of its trade portfolio it moved faster than required in this regard. For example, the government decided that for clothing, only a seven-year, rather than the suggested ten-year, period of adjustment should be imposed (Kaplan 2004: 633) .
In certainly a leftward shift in relation to previous macroeconomic approaches developed during the post-apartheid era (Tregenna 2011: 634) . It puts employment at the heart of the policy, rather than simply economic growth, demonstrated by its target of creating five million new jobs by 2020 (Economic Development Department 2010: 8). It also sees a more active role for the state (industrial policy, a more interventionist competition policy, improved education and skills, and a rolling programme of investment in infrastructure) and proposes wage moderation, including the capping of higher salaries. Nevertheless, it still sees the private sector as being the main driver of employment creation and outlines how government should continue to maintain a tight fiscal policy, which may ultimately undermine the ability of a more active state to alter the growth path of the economy. Moreover, it steps back from a more radical agenda such as a more progressive structure of taxation and controls on capital flows, to reduce the power of transnational capital to continue to determine the policy agenda.
Capital flight is an issue completely ignored in the NGP and it has been suggested that this is 'a symbol of the power of finance that needs to be overcome if any new type of growth path is to come onto the agenda' (Fine 2012b: 565) .
The NGP, as discussed below, is viewed in contrasting ways by different sections of the South African left. Unsurprisingly, those in government see the NGP and the associated Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) as 'seeking some quite bold and fairly ambitious changes' (Davies, 24 October 2011) . Similarly, Habib argues that, taken together these policies represent 'the strongest indication of the government's shift to the left ' (2013: 98) . In contrast, others emphasise the continuities between the NGP and the development strategy that has been followed since GEAR. One interviewee suggested that, despite the rhetoric contained in the preamble, when we look at the detail 'the prescription comes out the 
The Left within the Tripartite Alliance
Historically, it was certainly the case that during the liberation struggle against the apartheid regime, the most significant leftist formations within South Africa were to be found within the ANC, organised labour and to a lesser extent, the SACP. As McKinley (2009) there is now a leftist grouping within the party is questionable. Historically the ANC began life as a fairly conservative organisation. It has always operated as a broad-church and was only united by the struggle against racial division and apartheid. The achievement of democracy, aptly described as an 'elite transition' by Bond (2000) , led to a series of compromises that saw South Africa move fairly smoothly from apartheid to neoliberalism.
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As negotiations began in earnest in the early 1990s the ANC began to align itself with 'Third Way' thinking and as Rethmann observes (2009: 367) , it used the same advisors as New
Labour did in the UK. During the last two decades there have been significant power shifts within the ANC itself. Much of the leadership has now become part of the business establishment, thanks in part to the introduction of BEE.
The SACP does appear, on the surface at least, to be becoming more significant in recent years. When the party was unbanned in 1990, its total membership stood at just 2,000 (Connell 1995: 19) . However, this had risen to 150,000 in 2013 with a trebling of size during There are weaknesses, however, with its current position within the wider left. As one interviewee suggested, COSATU has remained constrained by its membership of the Alliance but it has also 'distanced itself from ongoing struggles that are happening in working class communities' (Gentle, 31 October 2011) . During the post-apartheid era, COSATU members have enjoyed a relatively privileged position in South African society. During this period the COSATU Workers' Survey has been able to trace how their social characteristics have changed as public sector unionisation has increased, resulting in a relative decline in the proportion of members classified as unskilled or semi-skilled (Bischoff and Tshoaedi 2013: 51) . This may help to explain 'their optimism and support for democracy, the government and institutions such as the tripartite alliance' (Buhlungu 2008: 40) . Hence, COSATU has evolved from an organisation that pursued wider social transformation (social movement unionism) to one that increasingly prioritises collective bargaining within the parameters prescribed by post-apartheid labour legislation (political unionism) (Gentle 2014; Masiya 2014; Mosoetsa and Tshoaedi 2013; Pillay 2013) . This problematizes the debate on COSATU and the calls for it to break free from the Alliance and become independent.
While COSATU leaving the Alliance might help to develop a significant and influential leftist movement, it does not represent precarious workers and the underemployed in South Africa (Saul 2013: 218) . It has failed to make any progress in recruiting beyond its core base of workers in the formal economy. As a result COSATU could become 'increasingly isolated from the rest of the working class, particularly from the new movements formed to mobilize against the effects of economic liberalization on the working poor and the unemployed' (Buhlungu 2008: 37) . In fact, in parts of the mining sector, the perceived weakness of the COSATU-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has led to a surge in recruitment by breakaway mining union, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). So the question of whether COSATU remains in the Alliance or not, is not a panacea for the left given the significant changes in the profile of its membership over recent years. Instead the key issue is how COSATU 'relates to what has become the majority of the working class, which is the casualised, informalised and so on, of which they have no relationship at all' (Gentle, 31 October 2011) .
Those in the Alliance left often distinguish between the performance of the government during the Mbeki and Zuma eras respectively. In doing so, they demonstrate an awareness of the observations made in the first half of this article, with regard to the direction of the development strategy that the government has adopted during the post-apartheid era. For example, one leading SACP representative suggested that in addition to the legacies of apartheid, South Africa is suffering from 'some reverse gears that we took in the last ten years by the previous ANC administration, in its adoption of most conservative policies, the so-called GEAR' (Magaxa, 28 October 2011) . Similarly, Masiya suggests that at the time of Polokwane, 'COSATU argued that Zuma would facilitate a fundamental shift in…the economy to help improve workers' conditions ' (2014: 453) . The debate here is whether the contrast they seek to make between the two administrations outweighs aspects of constancy. (2011: 448) . Such an approach sits comfortably with a neoliberal strategy, which seeks to depoliticise the process of development in favour of a focus on the effective delivery of services.
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The compromised position, resulting from its close links with the ANC, of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) has been symptomatic of this trajectory. We have seen a number of civil society organisations become both co-opted and marginalised. Hence, it has been argued that 'SANCO was no more revolutionary than was the ANC itself. Nor was it particularly confrontational in championing anyone's cause, least of all the 'historically marginalised'' (Seekings 2011: 145) . This meant that for the ANC's first term of office, at least, the remnants of this key part of the anti-apartheid movement lay dormant, with the majority of the population putting their faith in the ANC to deliver (Gentle 2014) .
However, as the full impacts of the GEAR programme took hold during the late 1990s (in Since the turn of the century, we have also seen the rapid growth of what have been labelled as 'service delivery protests' (see Zuern 2014) . Alexander (2012) suggests that South Africa is rather unique in the extent of such ongoing unrest in urban areas. In fact, these protests, although localised, tend to be about more than just the delivery of services and include very real concerns about unemployment and the accountability of local politicians. What they signify is that there is a level of resistance, however spontaneous and uncoordinated, to the neoliberal policies of the government. This led one interviewee to assert that South Africa 'is not a country which has a crushed working class' (Gentle, 31 October 2011) . However, detailed research into specific protests highlights that beyond a demonstration effect engendered by media coverage, there are no organic links between them and scant evidence of 'sharing experiences, let alone coordinating action' (Alexander 2010: 36) . Another study draws very similar conclusions noting that 'one of the striking elements of South-African protest is its failure to 'scale up', or join together either geographically or politically' (Bond, Desai, and Ngwane 2013: 238) .
For the left outside of the Alliance, therefore, it is difficult to make strategic use of such visible disenchantment with the current order. Although the level of protests has intensified since the election of Zuma, the politics behind them are complicated. Alexander highlights (2010: 34) that he 'found no evidence that Zuma, or the ANC in general, were held responsible for people's problems, and some of his interviewees argued that the timing of the protests was linked to having a government that, at long last, would listen to people and 24 address their complaints'. Similarly, Sinwell (2011: 66) concludes, that despite the radical nature of the tactics employed in such protests, given the ANC's ideational hegemony, it is a mistake to assume that underlying them is a clear commitment to a new, leftist politics. It may be that the massacre of striking miners at Marikana in August 2012 proves to be a turning point both in how the ANC are viewed and in sharpening the emerging splits within COSATU (Alexander 2013) . Such horrifically violent actions by the police force made it clear that the ANC government will ultimately protect the interests of capital by any means possible.
Nevertheless, for the left outside of the Alliance, the localised nature of such protests remains problematic in two senses. First, it restricts their ability to seek to connect them into anything more significant. Second, there is a disjuncture between localised struggles and the perceptions of the poor towards national government and the role of the ANC in particular.
As Zuern (2014: 288) suggests, many of these protests are actually led by ANC members who employ the use of protests to pursue their own careers within the party.
In recent years there has been an attempt to unite many of the disparate elements of the nonAlliance left. In 2008 the Conference of the Democratic Left was created and this was relaunched in January 2011 as the Democratic Left Front (DLF). In the words of one of the architects it is hoped the DLF:
can contribute to consolidating, building an alternative politics beginning to build the linkages, build the bridges and helping us to bring together these popular struggles, these social movements with an intelligentsia, with a continuity in struggle, with an inter-generational dynamic and also with a tradition of left politics which comes from outside of the Communist Party (Andrews, 31 October 2011) .
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The DLF is currently still rather embryonic and is led largely by disillusioned former SACPmembers. Its rather vague stance is that other parts of the South African left are stuck in old revolutionary paradigms and that what is needed is new ideas. The DLF is committed to a more democratic form of left politics and there is an awareness of the need to be sensitive to both gender inequalities and environmental challenges. In contrast, there are those within the revolutionary socialist left who suggest that the DLF is 'largely about how we can make this participatory democracy work…within the capitalist frame' (Blake, 27 October 2011) .
The problem remains that both electorally and in ideational terms the ANC maintains a position of hegemony amongst a significant fraction of the South African population. Despite the renewed attempts at co-ordinating an alternative leftist programme outside of the Alliance, there remains a need to connect this to the masses. Meanwhile, COSATU does have a membership base that would allow organic links to be formed with the rank and file. As one interviewee put it, 'if you don't engage with the COSATU rank and file, you're really engaging in futile sectarian struggles, that is what the DLF needs to do' (Fataar, 30 October 2011) . Activists in the DLF do seem to be aware of this dilemma and it has been noted how they have been visible in various activities to highlight their solidarity with the workers at Marikana (Saul and Bond 2014: 264) . The likelihood of the approach adopted by the revolutionary socialist left being remotely effective is small to the say the least. While a new left project in South Africa clearly needs to offer an alternative to the largely rhetorical stance adopted by the ANC and SACP, given the failures of vanguardism, it also needs to adopt a strategy that is likely to attract widespread support. Moreover, it is a fallacy to suggest, as the revolutionary left often do, that the options are simply revolution or social-democratic reformism. In this sense it would be wise to look to the Gramscian idea of 'structural reform', which in the context of South Africa, has been developed in the work of Saul. During the transition to democracy he suggested that such an approach offers the possibility of avoiding 'the twin dangers of, on the one hand, a romantic (and inevitably all too rhetorical) ultra-revolutionary approach and, on the other, collapse into a mild reformism that will do little to alter the balance of inherited class power' (Saul 1992: 2). Structural reform implies that the push for concrete improvements to the lives of the impoverished South African majority should always include plans for more significant changes in the future. As I have argued in this article and as Saul (2011, 94) reminds us, these reforms need to be grounded in popular struggles so that the working class and their allies develop an awareness of their agency and capacity for future reforms.
Conclusions
The dangers of the continued absence of an effective leftist mass movement are clear. These are most evident in the populist politics of Julius Malema, who skilfully uses leftist rhetoric in speaking to precisely those people in society, the young and underemployed, who remain marginalised and disconnected from other leftist formations in South Africa. What Malema does very well is express the failings of the ANC government in a language that resonates.
His new political party, The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which he now leads as 'Commander in Chief' seeks to position 'itself as the vanguard of black South Africans rather than the working class as a whole' (Fogel 2014) .
There is no doubting that the formation of the EFF and the fact they secured over one million votes in the 2014 election is an important consideration for the processes of the realignment of 'the left' in South Africa that are discussed in this article. The EFF have helped to encourage an increased level of protest and dissent, which is reflective of their performative approach to politics within the National Assembly. Bond describes how 'exceptionally gripping protests against historic racial injustices emerged, which reflect EFF influence in South Africa's politics of symbolic drama ' (2015: 23) . However, as Nieftagodien (2014) usefully reminds us, the EFF is ultimately a product of the crisis in South Africa and the ANC's failings in government. We should remember that Malema and many other key figures in the EFF, built their political careers within the structures of the ANC. In fact, they explicitly portray themselves as part of that long tradition, which they argue has been corrupted in recent years. For example, Floyd Shivambu (Deputy President of the EFF)
suggests that 'during Comrade Julius Malema's leadership of the ANC Youth League, we understood that the struggle for economic freedom in our lifetime was not exclusively our struggle...we drew inspiration from the founding generation of the ANC Youth League' (2014: 10) . What this representation selectively ignores, argues Nieftagodien, is that 'the struggle for economic freedom was well underway when the ANCYL leaders awoke to the disastrous effects of South Africa's home-grown neoliberalism (2014: 25).
As a result, there is deep suspicion of the EFF amongst NUMSA's leaders because of both the EFF's limited links to a trade union base and the fact that Malema and others acted as 'crony capitalists' during their time at the helm of the ANC Youth League (Fogel 2014 ).
Bond notes that 'Malema's own personal tenderpreneurship…reportedly led to a $5 million looting of state coffers ' (2014b: 17) . The EFF's approach is based on vanguardism and this has resulted in its limited involvement in the broader realignment of leftist forces that is underway (Nieftagodien 2014) . Shivambu is clear in his view that other factions of the left need to unite under the banner of the EFF and he confidently predicts that 'efforts to start a rival socialist or workers' party will dwindle into insignificance and will not benefit the working class and workers whom our ideological allies claim to represent' (Shivambu 2015: 16).
In conclusion, this article has highlighted how the left within post-apartheid South Africa remains factionalised to a large extent, despite attempts by first the DLF and now the United Instead efforts should be continued in the task of co-ordinating leftist formations outside of the Alliance. However this alone, without clear links to the mass base, will not lead to meaningful socio-economic progress for many South Africans. If COSATU were to formally break away from the Alliance then it might be able to help in this regard, but given its changing social composition, it could only partially fulfil such a role at best. A potential mass workers' party in South Africa would have to '…be able to move beyond the specific interests of the organised working class in order to raise concerns of the entire social class' (Whittaker 2014 ). NUMSA's call for the rest of COSATU to split from the Alliance seems unlikely to be heeded by the majority of the federation's trade unions. As Beresford demonstrates, the political views of workers cannot be assumed to simply correlate with their material interests and the ANC retains support, in part, because of the 'symbolic political capital which a liberation movement is endowed with upon assuming power ' (2015: 23) .
Moreover, the most recent COSATU Workers' Survey suggests that for two-thirds of members the main reasons for joining a union were either job security or improvements to pay and conditions (2012: 18) . It therefore remains difficult to be overly optimistic about the prospects for an effective leftist formation in South Africa, despite the recent attempts at coordination and the persistent socio-economic crisis outlined in the first half of this article.
